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Defendant and =•'""'~'"'~ 
v. SOl .. 
and five 
A. No. 23684. In Bank. Oct. 
SOL CARL ANNE LEN 
DivoJree-,JUidgJtuent--l~stoppel to Attack Dec:ree.-The validity 
of a divorce decree cannot be contested by a party who has pro-
cured the decree or a party who has remarried in reliance 
thereon or one who has aided another to procure the decree 
so that the latter will be free to marry. 
[2] Id. - Foreign Divorces - Estoppel. - A husband who went 
through a ceremony with full knowledge of the cir-
cumstances under which the wife obtained a foreign divorce 
decree dissolving a prior marriage, and who lived with her as 
husband for some time, is estopped to assert the invalidity of 
such decree, the theory that the marriage is not made 
valid by reason of the estoppel but that the estopped person 
may not take a position that the divorce or later marriage was 
invalid; public policy requires recognition of the second mar-
riage, and the principle of estoppel is applicable whether the 
divorce decree was alleged to be invalid for lack of jurisdic-
tion, or whether the second marriage took place before a year 
after entry of a California interlocutory decree. (Disap-
proving Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal. A pp.2d 871 [185 P.2d 381]; 
Sullivan v. Sullivan~. 219 Cal. 734 [28 P.2d 914]; Estate of 
Elliott, 165 Cal. 339 [132 P. 439]; Dominguez v. Dominguez, 
136 Cal.App.2d 17 P.2d 195]; and Parmann v. Parmann, 
56 Cal.App.2d 67 [132 P.2d 851], insofar as they may be to the 
contrary.) 
[3] !d.-Temporary Alimony, Counsel Fees and Oosts.-Where a 
husband is estopped to the validity of a marriage which 
took place before a year after entry of an interlocutory 
---------------
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce 
Divorce and § 482. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] 
Divorce, s 179: 
154; [ 6] Divorce, 
[10] Costs, § 37; 
of Process; [17] Costs, 
livery,§ 78. 
and Separation, § 148; Am.Jur., 
§ 135; [2] Divorce, § 307; 
[5] Husband and Wife, 
§ 7; [9] Marriage, § 32; 
§§ 60, 64; [12-16] Abuse 
49; [18] Claim and De-
for separate maintenance. 
the wife is entitled 
trial and on 
declared valid and 
of Void Marria,ge--I.iability for Fraud 
Inducing Marriage--Property Rights.-A wife's action 
her husband for fraud the which took 
'"'''"''~"''""" divoree de-
services render,ed. 
[5] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Contracts.-A hus-
band and wife may agree with each other as to their property 
rights, and he is not liable for the support of her children by 
a prior husband in the absence of an agreement, adoption or 
some other arrangement. 
[6] Divorce-Public Policy-Protection of Marriage Relation.-
Public policy seeks to foster and protect marriage, to encourage 
parties to live together, and to prevent separation, but it does 
not discourage divorce where relations between husband and 
wife are such that the legitimate of matrimony have 
been destroyed. 
[7] !d.-Public Policy-Contracts.-In the absence of fraud, col-
lusion or imposition on the court, policy does not prevent 
parties who have separated from entering into a contract 
disposing of their property which shall become effec-
tive only in the event one the parties obtains a divorce, 
though such contract may be a factor in persuading a party 
who has a good cause of action for divorce to proceed to estab-
lish it. 
[8] Id.-Public Policy-Contracts.-A contract between an un-
married man and a married woman under which he promised to 
divide his property with her and support her children if she 
married him was not against public policy or promotive of 
divorce where the divorce was merely incidental to the agree-
ment, where the main purpose of the agreement was for sup-
port of the woman and her ehildren and division of property 
in return for her entering into a Mexican marriage ceremony 
which he led her to believe would be a valid marriage, and 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Marriage, § 26 et seq.; Am.Jur., Marriage, 
§ 236 et seq. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Divorce and Separation, § 12 et seq. 
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where the objects of the marriage had already been destroyed, 
it was beyond saving when the promise was made, and there 
was little likelihood of reconciliation with the husband. 
[9] Marriage-Evidence.-A finding that a woman believed in good 
faith that she was legally married to a man with whom she 
entered into a marriage ceremony in Mexico was sustained by 
evidence that her attorney told her that the marriage lay in an 
"unsettled" field of law and he thought he could establish 
estoppel and she took his word for it, and by evidence that, 
notwithstanding she heard the court declare that the two were 
not married at the hearing of a pendente lite support claim, 
she filed notice of appeal from an order denying such claim 
and continued to have intercourse with the man under the 
belief that they were married. 
[10] Costs-Taxation-Relief From Mistake.-Where the court 
disallowed an item for preparing a reporter's transcript in 
plaintiff's cost bill after a minute order had previously been 
made ordering such transcript, the mistake was clearly one of 
fact, and plaintiff's motion under Code Civ. Proc., § 473, to be 
relieved from the order taken against her by mistake should be 
granted where it was timely made after discovery of the mis-
take. 
[11] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Orders Refusing to Vacate 
Judgment or Order.-Ordinarily, an order denying a motion to 
vacate a judgment or order is not appealable, but an appeal 
may be taken from an order denying such motion where the 
judgment was obtained through mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect. 
[12] Abuse of Process-Evidence.-In an alleged wife's action 
against her husband for abuse of process in having a claim and 
delivery writ issued, resulting in the seizure of an automobile 
when title thereto was at issue in plaintiff's main action, malice 
could be inferred from defendant's conduct where such seizure 
was done for the ulterior purpose of making things difficult 
for plaintiff so she would drop her main action. 
[13] Id.-Definition.-One who uses legal process, criminal or 
civil, against another to accomplish a purpose for which it is 
not designed is liable to the other for the pecuniary loss caused 
thereby. 
[14] !d.-Elements of Actionable Abuse.-The gravamen of an 
action for abuse of process is not the wrongful procurement 
of legal process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil 
proce€dings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how prop-
erly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was 
designed to accomplish. 
[15] !d.-Elements of Actionable Abuse.-The essential elements 
of abuse of process are an ulterior purpose and a wilful act 
in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct 
Oct.l957] SPELLENS v. SPELLENS 
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of the proceeding; the improper purpose usually takes the form 
of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly in-
volved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of prop-
erty or the payment of money by the use of the process as a 
threat or club. 
[16] Id.-Damages.-The compensatory damages recoverable for 
abuse of process include mental suffering. 
[17] Costs-Items Allowable- Attorneys' Fees: Damages- At-
torneys' Fees.-Ordinarily, fees paid to attorneys are not re-
coverable from the opposing party as costs, damages or other-
wise in the absence of express statutory or contractual author-
ity. 
[18] Claim and Delivery-Costs and Expenses of Litigation.-
There is no express authority for the allowance of attorney's 
fees in claim and delivery, and such fees may not be awarded as 
damages in actions for the recovery of personal property. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from orders denying costs, support and 
attorney's fees pendente lite, denying relief from order taxing 
costs, and allowing attorney's fees. Orlando H. Rhodes and 
Stanley Mosk, Judges. Judgments affirmed in part and re-
versed in part; order denying costs, support and attorney's 
fees pendente lite during trial and on appeal, reversed except 
insofar as they allow attorney's fees; order denying relief 
from order taxing costs, reversed ; appeal from order denying 
motion to vacatB order awarding costs and attorney's fees 
on appeal, dismissed. 
Action to have a marriage declared valid and for separatB 
maintenance or in the alternative damages for fraudulent 
representations, and for other relief. Judgment for defendant 
reversed in part; portion of judgment allowing attorney's fees 
in separate action for claim and delivery, reversed; other 
portions of judgments, affirmed. 
Leonard Horwin and Richard I. M. Kelton for Appellant 
Annelen Spellens. 
Reynolds, Painter & Oherniss, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross, 
Pacht, Ross, Warne & Bernhard, Isaac Pacht, Clore Warne, 
Stuart L. Kadison, Harvey M. Grossman and Ellis J. Horvitz 
for Appellant Sol Carl Spellens. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff, married to Robert Seymon, had 
marital difficulties because of Robert's conduct; there were 





that when he would marry take care 
of her and her children and make her a in all of 
his tried to save her with Robert 
but was unsuccessful. In she decided to divorce 
Robert and defendant for an to represent 
her and funds therefor. She commenced an action 
for divorce the next based on extreme After 
the commencement of the defendant conferred with 
Robert about a property settlement and advised plaintiff to 
waive her rights to any property and all but a 
nominal $1.00 per month alimony. This she did, and defend-
ant again made the same he had made before. 
Plaintiff obtained an divorce decree on March 
13, 1951, and defendant represented that upon the granting 
of the interlocutory decree he and plaintiff could be legally 
married in Mexico and the marriage would be valid any-
where. He took her to Mexico where he obtained an attorney 
who gave the same advice. Four days after the interlocutory 
decree, plaintiff and defendant returned to Mexico and saw 
the same attorney who was shown the decree and confirmed 
his former advice. As a result of this advice plaintiff and 
defendant were married in Mexico by the attorney, and they 
began living as husband and wife with plaintiff's 
children as of the Plaintiff became pregnant by 
defendant in 1951 and had a miscarriage. During the time 
they lived together defendant was extremely cruel to plaintiff, 
and in March, 1952, defendant suggested they separate, to 
which plaintiff objected, but defendant said he had been 
advised they were not married. Plaintiff consulted 
an attorney and was advised that the validity of her marriage 
lay in the field of unsettled but he thought defendant 
would be to assert its Plaintiff thereupon 
commenced her action called main action) on 
Jli[arch 24, 1952. The for a brief period but 
then lived until defendant left her in September, 
195~. 
In an amended asked that her marriage 
be declared valid, that defendant be estopped to question its 
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amendments other 
eauses of and after au adverse by the 
(•ourt as to some of a second amended complaint for 
for fraud was filed. She a division of the 
rmnna-..f·y, and to be ad litem 
for their support on the 
spouse. Defendant made denials 
and asserted as an affirmative defense that the marriage was 
void as after the entry of an interlocutory decree but 
before the entry of a final decree of divorce and asked that 
it be declared invalid. 
The case was finally tried after various motions for support 
and attorney's fees hereinafter mentioned. 'l'he court in its 
findings recited that defendant raised the issue of the validity 
of the marriage and by stipulation plaintiff was to make an 
offer of proof thereon and on the pleadings and the offer the 
court should decide that issue and determine whether defend-
ant was estopped to deny its valiuity, as though such issues 
had arisen through an objection by defendant to the introduc-
tion of any evidence by plaintiff; all facts pleaded and set 
forth in the offer of proof were to be taken as true on those 
issues, hence the question presented was one of law. Also 
involved was the question of whether plaintiff could recover 
on the agreement of defendant that he would validly marry 
plaintiff, share his property with her and care for plaintiff 
and her children if she married him. 'rhe court sustained 
the objection to the introduction of any evidence on those 
issues; the court then found the facts true on those issues; in 
its conclusion of law it determined that the marriage was 
invalid and no estoppel could exist. It also determined that 
the "agreement" was invalid as promotive of divorce. It 
granted plaintiff permission to file her second amended com-
plaint. The trial proceeded, and the court granted a nonsuit 
as to the first and third causes of action in the second amended 
complaint which was for damages for defendant's fraudulent 
representations and plaintiff's reliance thereon to her injury 
and also for the reliance by herself and children on the mis-
representations of defendant as to their support and main-
tenance, holding as a matter of law that there could be no 
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recovery for such fraud. The court then found that plaintiff 
and defendant were well acquainted since 1947 and went 
through a marriage ceremony in Mexico and from March 
17, 1951, to September 22, 1952, they resided together as hus-
band and wife and plaintiff in good faith believed the marriage 
valid; that plaintiff would testify that her marriage with 
Robert had failed; that plaintiff was of limited business and 
no legal experience but defendant claimed much legal experi-
ence; that plaintiff trusted and had great confidence in de-
fendant which vms fostered by him; that defendant made the 
representations to plaintiff heretofore referred to in the state-
ment of facts and intended that plaintiff rely thereon and 
plaintiff relied thereon, marrying defendant, living with him 
as a wife and having her children reside with them; that 
defendant represented to friends, relatives and others that 
they were married; that after the commencement of the action 
herein the same conditions continued to exist except that 
defendant represented to the court that the marriage was 
invalid ; that during all of said time defendant knew the mar-
riage was invalid and intended it that way which facts were 
known exclusively by him; that plaintiff and defendant were 
not legally married because of the lack of a final decree of 
divorce; that defendant treated plaintiff with extreme cruelty 
to her physical and mental prejudice; that during the time 
plaintiff rendered valuable services to defendant in the belief 
that she was his wife, and during said time defendant earned 
$58,574 out of a total income of $79,244; that "by analogy to 
the community property laws of the State . . . the residue of 
the sums earned by ... defendant . . . as the result of his 
own efforts during the period commencing March 17, 1951, 
and ending September 22, 1952, after deducting money spent 
by way of quasi-community expense, is ... $10,052.00 ... 
that included in said quasi-community expense and, therefore, 
deducted by the Court in arriving at the balance of quasi-
community income on hand, is ... $7,200.00 ... which was 
expended by the defendant ... during said period in the 
support of plaintiff's aforesaid minor children .... " 
Accordingly judgment was entered determining the mar-
riage to be invalid; that no estoppel existed and no damages 
were recoverable 1 for defendant's fraud; that plaintiff was 
the putative wife of defendant from March 17, 1951, to Sep-
'Pursuant to Civil Code, section 43.5(d): 
"No cause of action arises for: ... 
"(d) Breach of promise of marriage." 
Oet.1957] SPELLENS "'· SPELLENS 
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tember 22, 1952; that by reason of the latter fact and de-
fendant's cruelty, plaintiff was entitled to all the "commu-
nity" property earned during the mentioned period), 
plus $10,052, the balance of the "quasi-community property 
after deduction of quasi-community expense"; that plaintiff 
may not recover her attorney's fees incurred in the action; 
that plaintiff should not recover on the other issues disposed 
of on stipulation and objection to her evidence. Both plaintiff 
and defendant appeal from the portions of the judgment un-
favorable to each of them. 
After commencing her action plaintiff had an order to show 
cause issued why she should not be allowed counsel fees, costs 
and support money pendente lite. The court denied any al-
lowance on the ground that there was no valid marriage. She 
appeals from that order of denial. She also asked for the 
same allowances pending her appeal from that order and was 
allowed attorney's fees on appeal but no support. She appeals 
from the portion of that order denying her an allowance for 
support. Defendant's motion to set aside the order fixing 
counsel fees was denied and he appeals from that order. 
Plaintiff contends that the defendant was estopped to deny 
the validity of the Mexican marriage or, stated another way, 
that he was estopped to deny that the California interlocutory 
decree of divorce from Robert terminated that marriage and 
made the Mexican marriage valid as far as he was concerned; 
that thus the parties, as far as defendant and this litigation 
is concerned, must be treated as husband and wife. Defend-
ant contends that the strong policy of this state forbids the 
establishing of an estoppel ;2 that no marriage contrary to 
statute may be created by estoppel. 
[1] The rule on estoppel is stated in Watson v. Watson, 
39 Cal.2d 305, 307 [246 P .2d 19] : "To maintain his action 
it is necessary for the plaintiff to deny the validity of the 
Nevada divorce decree which he secured from his first wife . 
. . . In Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796, 805 [221 P.2d 
1, 20 A.L.R. 2d 1152], the court stated that 'tke validity of a 
1'' A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the life 
of a former husband or wife of such person, with any person other than 
such former husband or wife, is illegal and void from the beginning, 
unless: 
'' 1. The former marriage has been annulled or dissolved. In no 
case can a marriage of either of the partie~ during the life of the other, 
be valid in this state, if contracted within on() year after the entry of an 
interlocutory decree in a proceeding for divorce." (Civ. Code, ~ 61, 
subd. 1.) 
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divorce decree cannot be contested a who has pro-
cured the decree or a party who has remarried in reliance 
thereon or by one who has aided another to procure the decree 
so that the latter will be free to marry! The decisions in this 
state and in other states are ample authority for the statement 
in the Rediker case. 
''The fact that in the present case it had been deter-
mined in a prior action that no marriage existed at the time 
of the alleged tort does not benefit the plaintiff's position. 
Such an eventuality was taken into consideration in Harlan 
v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 [161 P.2d 490]. Before their 
marriage the plaintiff husband in that case had been instru-
mental in securing a Mexican divorce for the defendant from 
her first husband. Thereafter the plaintiff sought an annul-
ment of their marriage as bigamous, asserting that the Mexi-
can divorce was invalid for want of jurisdiction of the court. 
That situation is analogous to the present case in that in 
bringing his action it is neeessary for the plaintiff to assert 
the invalidity of a previous divorce obtained by him. In the 
Harlan case the trial court found that the Mexican divorce 
decree was invalid, as was the Nevada divorce in the present 
case, and granted the annulment. In reversing the judgment 
the court held that notwithstanding the fact that the Mexican 
decree was invalid, the plaintiff was estopped from asserting 
its invalidity because he had aided and counseled the defend-
ant in procuring it. In the present case the plaintiff is like-
wise estopped from asserting the invalidity of the Nevada 
divorce obtainod through his own machination. The fact that 
he obtained that divorce as the party participant states a 
stronger case against him than operated as an estoppel in 
the Harlan case. 
"In a decision by the New York Court of Appeals, relied 
upon in the Rediker case, a defendant in a suit for separate 
maintenance asserted as a defense that the marriage was 
bigamous on the ground that a prior divorce he had obtained 
from a Nevada court was invalid for want of jurisdiction of 
that court. The New York court expressly assumed the in-
validity of the divorce action but refused to let it be asserted, 
stating that 'to refuse to permit this defendant to escape his 
obligation to support plaintiff does not mean that the courts 
of this State recognize as valid a judgment of divorce which 
necessarily is assumed to be invalid in the case at bar, but only 
that it is not open to defendant in these proceedings to avoid 
the responsib,ility which he voluntarily incurred.' (Krause v. 
SPELLENS v. SPELLENS 
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282 N.Y. 359-360 [26 N.E.2d 290].)" (Emphasis 
added.) [2] It is said in Dietrich v. 41 Cal.2d 497, 
505 [261 P.2d 2691: "On this record it is immediately obvious 
that the very evidence offered to show the invalidity of the 
ceremonial marriage was properly excluded because that same 
evidence shows that Noah is estopped to assert the claimed 
invalidity of the Nevada divorce [obtained by Carol from an-
other man]. \Vith fun know ledge of the circumstances under 
which that divorce was obtained, and in reliance on such di-
vorce, Noah went through a marriage ceremony and lived 
with Carol as her husband for many years. The public 
policy of this state, in the circumstances of this case, as in 
those considered in Rediker v. Rediker (1950), 35 Cal.2d 796, 
808 [221 P.2d 1, 21 A.L.R.2d 1152], requires recognition of 
the second marriage rather than the 'dubious attempt to 
resurrect the original' marriage." (Emphasis added.) (See 
also Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796 [221 P.2d 1, 21 A.L.R. 
2d 1152] ; Bruguiere v. Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199 [155 P. 988, 
Ann. Cas. 1917, 122]; Kelsey v. MiUer, 203 Cal. 61 [263 P. 
200]; Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 [161 P.2d 490]; 
Estate of Davis, 38 Cal.App.2d 579 [101 P.2d 761, 102 P.2d 
545}; Hensgen v. Silberman, 87 Cal.App.2d 668 [197 P.2d 
356]; In re Kyle, 77 Cal.App.2d 634 [176 P.2d 96); Adoption 
of D. S., 107 Cal.App.2d 211 [236 P.2d 821] ; Estate of Oole-
nwn, 132 Cal.App.2d 137 (281 P.2d 567] ; Union Bank & 
Trust Oo. v. Gordon, 116 Cal.App.2d 681 [254 P.2d 644] ; 
Morrow v. Morrow, 40 Cal.App.2d 474 [105 P.2d 129]; 175 
A.L.R. 538; 153 id. 941; 140 id. 914; 122 A.L.R. 1324; 109 id. 
1018; Rest., Conflicts, § 112.) Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal.App. 
2d 871 [185 P.2d 381], insofar as it is to the contrary must be 
deemed as disapproved. The theory is that the marriage 
is not made valid by reason of the estoppel but that the 
estopped person may not take a position that the divorce or 
latter marriage was invalid. (Watson v. Watson, supra, 39 
Cal.2d 305; Rediker v. Rediker, supra, 35 Cal.2d 796.) And 
as to the public policy it is said: " 'To hold otherwise protects 
neither the welfare nor morals of society but, on the contrary, 
such holding is a flagrant invitation to others to attempt to 
circumvent the law, cohabit in unlawful state, and when 
tired of such situation, apply to the courts for a release from 
the indicia of the marriage status.' (Harktn v. Harlan, 70 
Cal.App.2d 657, 663-664 [161 P.2d 490} .) ... 
"Defendant contends, however, that the public policy of 
220 SPELLENS 
the state 
ever their bigamous character is discovered. 
for such a of 
fendant does not indicate how any 
by the annulment of his 
C.2d 
when-
W c find no basis 
... De-
" 'It can no longer be said that requires non-
recognition of all foreign divorces. We have recog-
nized that the interest of the state in many situations may lie 
with recognition of such divorces and of remar-
riages rather than a dubious attempt to resurrect the original. 
From a pragmatic viewpoint, invalidation of irregu-
lar foreign divorces and attendant remarriages, years after 
both events, is a less than efrective sanction against an insti-
tution whose charm lies in its immediate respectability. We 
think it may now be stated that the genet·al public policy in 
this jurisdietion, as judicially interpreted, no longer prevents 
application in annulment actions of the laches and estoppel 
doctrines in determining the effect to be given such divorce 
decrees.' (Vinson J., in Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 753, 757; 
Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657, 663-664 [161 P.2d 490]; 
Krattse v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 360 [26 N.E.2d 290].) We 
conclude that the public policy of this state requires the 
preservation of the second marriage and the protection of 
the rights of the second spouse 'rather than a dubious attempt 
to resurrect the original' marriage." (Rediker v. Rediker, 
snpra, 35 Cal.2d 796, 806.) 
The foregoing authorities involved an estoppel to deny 
the validity of a decree invalid because of lack of juris-
diction of the court which purported to grant it but we think 
the same policy requires the same result in the instant case 
where there was a marriage before a year after the entry of 
an interlocutory decree. The policy applies equally in one 
case as the other. The policy against a bigamous marriage 
expressed in the first sentence of section 61 of the Civil Code, 
supra, involved in the cited cases, is no stronger nor more com-
pelling than that involved here which is that there may not 
be a valid marriage if contracted within less than a year after 
the entry of an interlocutory decree of divorce. (Civ. Code, 
§ 61, subd. 1, supra.) We fail to see any difference in this 
case and one where defendant had participated in the obtain-
ing of an invalid Nevada or Mexican divorce rather than a 
California interlocutory decree. It is not the marriage 
which is found valid as indicated by the aboye authorities and 
thus the policy of section 61, subdivision 1, is not thwarted. 
Oct.1957] SPELLENS v. SPELLENS 
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Rather it is that defendant by reason of his conduct will not 
be permitted to its validity or the divorce; so far as 
he is he and plaintiff are husband and wife. The 
interlocutory decree declared that the parties were entitled 
to a divorce and it was not unreasonable for plaintiff to have 
been led to believr that a marriage in Mexico would be valid. 
'l'he circumstances here clearly show fraud and estoppel as 
far as the defendant is concerned; it would be difficult to 
imagine a stronger case in this field of law. 
The statement in Rediker v. Rediker, supra, 35 Cal.2d 796, 
808, that the doctrine of estoppel "presupposes the entry of 
final decree" and for that reason certain cases are distin-
guishable, does not lay down a rule contrary to the foregoing 
conclusion; moreover if it seems to do so none is indicated in 
the other and later authorities heretofore cited. Such cases 
as Stdlivan v. Sullivan, 219 Cal. 734 [28 P.2d 914], Estate of 
Elliott, 165 Cal. 339 [132 P. 439], Dominguez v. Dominguez, 
136 Cal.App.2d 17 [288 P.2d 195], and Parmann v. Parmann, 
56 Cal.App.2d 67 [132 P.2d 851], do not discuss the theory of 
estoppel and its essential poliey and results as announced in 
the above discussed authorities; insofar as they may be con-
trary to the instant case they are overruled. The same might 
be said of Anderson v. Anderson .. 7 Cal.2d 265 [60 P.2d 290J, 
and Brandt v. Brandt, 32 Cal.App.2d 99 [89 P.2d 171], but 
in those cases there were no divorce proceedings to terminate 
the first proceeding and hence they are distinguishable. The 
out-of-state cases are not persuasive. An interlocutory decree 
of divorce at least gives color as a judicial determination of 
divorce especially when we consider that the final decree 
ordinarily follows at the end of a year as a matter of course.3 
""Unlike other preliminary or interlocutory orders, the statutory 
interlocutory decree in a divorce suit is final, except as against such 
attack as is authorized by statute for the modification or vacating of 
:final .iudgments. Such a decree, unless vacated on motion for new trial, 
on motion under § 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or on appeal, is 
a final adjudication of all matters therein decided, the final dissolution 
of the marriage being the only question held in abeyance pending entry 
of the final decree. If the interlocutory decree is regularly made and 
correctly entered, it cannot be vacated on the bare application of the 
plaintiff without notice to or consent of the defendant, even though the 
defendant defaulted. lndeed, it is expressly prm·ided that after entry 
of the interlocutory judgment. neither party has the right to dismiss 
the action without the other'~ ~onRent. 
''After the tinw to appeal or to move to vacate the decree has e.x-
pired, the trial court is wholly without jurisdiction to alter or set aside 
the interlocutory judgment. While it has the inherent power to refuse to 
enter a final decree dissolving the marriage, where it is made to appear 
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It may be noted also that we are not a common-law 
marriage which does not exist in this state for the theory is 
that the marriage is not validated; it is merely that defendant 
cannot contest it. Thus the judgment must be reversed. 
[3] It follows from the estoppel that plaintiff was entitled 
to attorney's fees, costs and support trial and on ap-
peal (see Dietrich v. Dietrich, supra, 41 Cal.2d 497) as de-
fendant is estopped to deny the validity of the marriage and 
the orders with respect thereto must be reversed. These 
matters will have to be determined by proceedings in the 
lower court. 
[4] Plaintiff's action for damages for fraud in inducing 
the marriage (see, Langley v. Schttrnacker, 46 Cal.2d 601 [297 
P.2d 977]) should not stand as she, by the estoppel, is receiv-
ing everything flowing from a valid marriage and we apply 
the same law as if they were validly married; this is con-
ceded by plaintiff as she states in her brief: "On this appeaL, 
the issue of whether California abolished the right of a woman 
who is fraudulently induced into a void marriage to sue for 
her injury is only reached if this Appellate Court holds that 
no valid marriage exists between the parties. If the Appellate 
Court agrees with Annelen that the parties are legally mar-
ried, this question is moot." That includes the situation 
where estoppel may exist as we have indicated it does. 
The same comments are true with regard to plaintiff's claims 
of property rights by reason of a putative marriage and 
compensation for wifely services rendered; defendant is 
estopped to deny the existence of a valid marriage and hence 
plaintiff must rely on rights which flow from a marital rela-
tionship. Being in such a position she should not be entitled 
to anything for services as defendant's wife. 
Plaintiff's action on the alleged oral agreement that defend-
ant promised plaintiff both before and after the commence-
ment of the divorce action vvhich resulted in the interlocutory 
decree from Robert that if she would divorce Robert and 
marry him he would divide all his property with her and 
support her children presents, however, a different question. 
that on a condonation of the ofl'ense on which the interlocutory judgment 
was based the parties resumed the maritnl relation. it does not follow that 
the court, after the lapse of a year, has jurisdiction to vacate an inter-
locutory judgment, the integrity of which, insofar as it determines the 
facts properly involved therein. is unaffected by subsequent relations 
of the parties. The facts having been thus finally adjudicated, the 
judgment can be set aside only by a proceeding in the nature of a direct 
attack." (16 Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, ~ 127.) 
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A husband and wife may agree with each oth~: as to 
their property and of course defendant is not liable 
for the support plaintiff's children by Robert in absence 
of an agreement, adoption or some other arrangement. She 
might under such an agreement obtain an interest in defend-
ant's separate property as well as the community property 
as support for her children by Robert to which she would 
not otherwise be entitled. Here the court nonsuited plaintiff 
on her action on the agreement on the ground that it was 
promotive of divorce and hence void and unenforceable. The 
court stated, however, "May I point out here, to you, that the 
Plaintiff's testimony about the defendant's promises are [sic] 
clear? In cross-examination they are perhaps whittled down 
somewhat, but it would be wholly improper for me to find he 
did not make such promises from this state of the evidence • 
. . . You may presume that the promises were made. My 
problem is, what is the effect of the promises 1 What is public 
policy in permitting recovery under such promises?" The 
court found that: "The parties stipulated that the plaintiff 
would testify that during all of the time ... to and includ-
ing the date of the decree of divorce between plaintiff and 
Robert Seymon, the ends of matrimony between plaintiff and 
Robert Seymon had been defeated and the Seymons were 
existing in a state of discordance and unhappiness." 'fhe 
evidence shows that defendant made his promises both be-
fore and after the divorce action was commenced. There is 
sufficient evidence from which it could be found that defend-
ant made the promises repeatedly and in part so that if she 
would marry him he would divide his property with her and 
support her children; as a part of his promises she was 
induced to claim no alimony from Robert (except a nominal 
sum) and no community property. 
Plaintiff contends that since the promise was made after 
plaintiff decided on a divorce and had grounds therefor, the 
objects of that marriage had ceased and the agreement is 
enforceable; that in any case the agreement as to the support 
of the children is not void and is severable from the rest of 
"'Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or trans-
action with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, 
which either might if unmarried .... " (Civ. Code, ~ 158.) 
"A husband and wife cannot, by any contract with each other, alter 
their legal relations, except as to property and except that they may 
agree, in writing, to an immediate separation, and may make provision 
for the support of either of them and of their children during such separa-
tion." (Emphasis added; Civ. Code, 4 159.) 
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the agreement. Defendant contends that part of the agree-
ment was that plaintiff would obtain a divorce from Robert 
and the fact that an action for divorce from him had matured 
and been commenced makes no difference since before the 
interlocutory decree and even thereafter there was the chance 
plaintiff and Robert would be reconciled. 
[6] Regardless of what the authorities may have hereto-
fore stated in regard to the validity of an agreement made 
in contemplation of a divorce, a recent statement by this 
court of the general policy on this subject, is pertinent here: 
"Public policy seeks to foster and protect marriage, to en-
courage parties to live together, and to prevent separation. 
[Citations.] But public policy does not discourage divorce 
where the relations between husband and wife are such that 
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly de-
stroyed. [Citation.] [7] In the absence of fraud, collusion or 
imposition upon the court, public policy does not prevent 
parties who have separated from entering into a contract dis-
posing of their property rights which shall become effective 
only in the event one of the parties obtains a divorce, even 
though such a contract may be a factor in persuading a party 
who has a good cause for divorce to proceed to establish it." 
(HiU v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 93 [142 P.2d 417] .) In Howard 
v. Adams, 16 Cal.2d 253, 255 [105 P.2d 971, 130 A.L.R. 1003], 
the contract was by appellant aunt to support plaintiff, her 
niece (who was married) and was: "Her [appellant's] con-
versation with plaintiff at this time, according to the latter's 
testimony was as follows: Plaintiff: 'I had driven over to my 
aunt's home with my three children; and I walked into her 
bedroom; and my aunt said, ''My heavens, what has happened 
to your eyes?" I said, "Homer [plaintiff's husband] has 
blackened both my eyes; he has beat me up all over my body 
and threatened to kill the children; I am afraid of him; I 
cannot live with him any longer; I am going right down now 
to see an attorney and get a divorce." My aunt said, "You 
can't do that here; think of my banks; think of the Baldwin 
name having any scandal here"; and I said, "I have heard 
if I go to Reno, Nevada, to get a divorce, I can't get alimony." 
My aunt said, "Never mind about that; if you do that and 
go to Reno, Nevada, and get a divorce, I will support you the 
rest of your life ; I will take care of the children and I will 
educate them." ... I said that for her sake that I would do 
what she asked me to do.' " The court held that since plain-
tiff had already decided on the divorce and had grounds 
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therefor before the agreement was made it was not invalid. 
Hill v. supr·a, 23 Cal.2d 82, 90; see Bradbnry v. 
Bradbury, 52 CaLApp.2d 547 [126 P.2d 673]; Bm·ham v. 
33 Cal.2d 416 [202 P.2d 289]; De Burgh v. De Burgh. 
39 Cal.2d 858 [250 P.2d 598].) 
[8] We think the evidence was susceptible of an inter-
that the divorce from Robert was incidental 
gr<~enlentt; that the main purpose of the agreement 
was for support of plaintiff and her children and division of 
""'·""·""'" in return for her entering into a Mexican marriage 
ceremony with defendant which he led her to believe would 
be a valid marriage so that she as his wife and her children 
could live with defendant, and that the objects of the marriage 
with Robert had been destroyed and it was beyond saving 
when the promise by defendant was repeated; that there was 
! ittle likelihood of reconciliation with Robert and the agree· 
nwnt did not bar such possibility. As so construed the agree-
ment would not be against public policy or promotive of 
divorce. Of course since a nonsuit was granted, we are only 
eoncerned with the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a 
prima facie case on behalf of plaintiff. 5 While the foregoing 
authorities and those cited by defendant are not factually 
the same, we believe that reason and justice require the 
reversal of the judgment as to the oral agreement. 
Plaintiff also complains that there should not have been 
any deduction from the award of community property to 
her of the sums used for her and her children's support 
during the period she and defendant lived together. That 
portion of the judgment cannot stand because of our decision 
as to estoppel and the validity of the support agreement. This 
changes the entire theory of the case and those matters will 
have to be redetermined on retrial in the light of our holding 
here. What action the court may take with reference to the 
agreement we cannot know inasmuch as a nonsuit was incor-
rectly granted and the matter is open for further proceed-
ings. 
[9] Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the finding that plaintiff believed in good faith in 
the validity of her marriage to defendant between March 17, 
1951, and September 22, 1952, at least after she consulted 
"It may be mentioned that defendant did not plead the statute of 
frauds or objeet to the introduction of evidence of a.n oral agreement; 





field of law and he 
took his word for it. The court was justified in draw-
the inference it did. Defendant further mentions that 
could not so believe after the court declared 
were not married at the on the lite support 
claim on 1952. She from the order of denial 
and testified that she still believed she could 
as valid and the court later in 
order be reversed on and the was iu 
good faith. Plaintiff testified on cross-examination : '' Q. 
Nevertheless, the fact that you filed this lawsuit against 
Mr. Spellens, you continued to have sexual intercourse with 
Mr. Spell ens f That is correct, is it not? A. because in 
my way of thinking, we were married. . .. 
"Q. And that continued for some months, did it not 1 A. 
Yes.'' During the course of the trial on March 4, 1953, 
Annelen testified: "I am still sure I am married to Mr. 
Spell ens.'' These facts and circumstances and this testimony 
amply support the finding that plaintiff believed in good faith 
that she and defendant were legally married up to the date 
of their final separation on September 22, 1952. 
[10] Plaintiff appeals from a denial of her motion to vacate 
an order of the trial court striking or taxing the item of costs 
claimed in her cost bill of $220.60 for a daily reporter's tran-
script of the proceedings. 6 Plaintiff filed her cost memoran-
dum including the item. Defendant moved to tax them. He 
objected to the item stating in his memorandum of points and 
authorities that reporter's fees for a daily transcript are not 
allowable unless ordered by the court and the court did not 
order them here. The court disallowed the item saying plain-
tiff was not entitled to it. However, a minute order had been 
previously made by the court during the trial which stated: 
''A daily transcript is ordered.'' Plaintiff moved to vacate 
the order taxing the item on the ground of mistake as to the 
existence of the minute order. In the uncontradicted affidavit 
of plaintiff's counsel it is stated that he was mistaken as to 
•• 'In civil eases the fees for reporting and for all other transcriptions 
ordered by the court to be made shall be paid by the parties in equal 
proportion, and either party at his option may pay the whole. In either 
case, all amounts so paid by the party to whom costs are awarded shall 
be taxed as costs in the case." (Gov. Code, § 69953.) There is thus 
no question that if the transcript was ordered by the court the cost 
eould be reeovered by the party entitled, plaintiff. 
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discoyer it until the clerk's transcript on appeal was pre-
; that at the time of the argument on the motion to tax 
the court its intention to allow the item if the law 
'l'he motion to vacate was denied and plain. 
Plaintiff relies on section 473 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure7 and a claimed inherent power in the court to correct 
its orders. In v. 0 63 Cal.App. 620 [219 P. 467], 
the court held there was a case for relief for mistake under 
section 473 where there was a mistake as to the amount of the 
costs included by the one entitled thereto. It is said in 
Lane v. Pacific Lines, 30 Cal.2d 914, 916 [187 
P .2d 9] : "It is plaintiffs' position that the trial court had 
no power to grant defendants relief from default and permit 
them to file the second motion to tax costs. They argue, first, 
that section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure can have no 
application to a motion to tax costs because such a motion is 
not a pleading within the language of the section which pro-
vides that application for relief 'must be accompanied by a 
copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed.' It 
is settled, however, that, under the provisions of section 473, 
the court may relieve a party from the effect of a delay in 
taking procedural steps which do not involve pleadings. (See 
Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390, 394 [143 P. 697] ; Pollitz v. 
Wickersham, 150 Cal. 238, 243 [88 P. 911].) Relief from 
default has been allowed under the provisions of section 473 
where a party failed to file a eost bill within the times pro-
vided in sections 1033 and 1034 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. (Soda v. Marriott, 130 Cal.App. 589, 594 [20 P.2d 
758]; Potter v. City of Compton, 15 Ca1.App.2d 238 [59 P.2d 
540]; Kallmeyer v. Poore, 52 CaLApp.2d 142, 153 [125 P.2d 
924].) Insofar as granting relief from default in filing is 
'"The court may, upon such terms as may be just, relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a judgment, order, or other proceeding 
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excus· 
able neglect. Application for such relief must be accompanied by a 
copy of the answer or other plealling proposed to be filed therein, other· 
wise the application shall not be granted, and must be made within a 
reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after such judgment, 
order or proceeding was taken. 
"The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, 
correct clerical mi~takes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to 
conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either 
party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or 
order." (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) 
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concerned, there appears to be no reason for making a dis-
tinction between a cost bill and a motion to tax costs.'' 
We see no reason why if the timeliness of filing costs pro-
ceedings may be reached by section 473, a mistake clearly 
one of fact as to what the court had done with reference to 
making the cost item allowable, should not likewise be cov-
ered by the first sentence of the of that section. 
'fhe action here in the item for the transcript was 
in the language of that portion in that it was an order taken 
against him through his mistake. The court had power to 
decide the question and should have done so. We do not have 
a case of judicial error but merely one of mistake of fact as 
to what the court had done. 
[11] There has been some question whether an order deny-
ing relief under section 473 in a case where relief may be 
asked properly under that section is appealable. The correct 
rule is stated: " ... when a judgment or order is not appeal-
able, it cannot be made reviewable by the device of moving 
to set it aside and appealing from an order denying the mo-
tion. This proposition stems from the rule that forbids a 
party to do indirectly what he may not do directly. Even 
where there is a right of appeal from a judgment or order, a 
party cannot ordinarily take an appeal from a subsequent 
order denying a motion to vacate the judgment or order com-
plained of, under such circumstances that the motion merely 
calls upon the court to repeat or overrule the former ruling 
on the same facts. And if the grounds upon which the parties 
seek to have a judgment vacated existed before the entry of 
the judgment and would have been available on an appeal 
from the judgment, an appeal will not lie from an order re-
fusing the motion. The party aggrieved by a judgment or 
order must take his appeal from such judgment or order it-
self, if an appeal therefrom is authorized by statute, and not 
from a subsequent order refusing to set it aside. The reason 
for denying an appeal in the latter case is not because the 
order on the motion to vacate is not within the terms of the 
statute allowing appeals, for it may be. Indeed, an order 
refusing to vacate a final judgment is in its very nature a 
special order made after judgment. But the right of appeal 
from the order is denied because it would be virtually allow-
ing two appeals from the same ruling, and would, in some 
cases, have the effect of extending the time for appeal, con-
trary to the intent of the statute. A further reason is that the 
order on the motion is merely a negative action of the court 
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uc'l'UJliHlts to disturb its first decision. The first decision being 
reviewable, the refusal any number of times to alter it does 
not make it less so." (3 Cal.Jnr.2d, Appeal and Error, §57.) 
". . . . And since a statute [Code Civ. Proc., § 473] 
makes express provision for a motion to vacate, an appeal may 
be taken from an order denying such motion where the judg· 
ment has been obtained through mistake, inadvertence, sur-
or excusable neglect. In every case where this course has 
been allowed, the order from which· the appeal was permitted 
was technically within the class of orders made directly ap-
pealable by statute, that is, a special order after final judg-
ment. In permitting a direct appeal, therefore, the court was 
merely relieving the appellant from a rule of practice to the 
effect that an order refusing to vacate a prior appealable 
order, although described as appealable by the statute, could 
not be made to take the place of an appeal from the original 
order." (3 Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, §58.) (See also 
Witkin, California Procedure, vol. 3, pp. 2170- 2173.) 
Here the relief sought is not to have the court recon-
sider exactly what it had considered before on the cost bill; 
it is asked to consider that there was a mistake of fact when 
it made its cost order, and it considered the fact as contrary 
to what the record shows ; that is not an effort to extend the 
time of appeal or obtain an appeal where none was available. 
The court must pass upon the question of the mistake and 
factors involved in relief under section 473. The appeal from 
the order of denial was therefore proper and the order must 
be reversed. 
There may be some question whether the minute order for 
a daily transcript above referred to was the court's own 
order or because of a request by plaintiff; that is a matter 
that should be determined on reconsideration of the cost bill 
and order taxing costs. 
[12] After the main action was commenced and was at issue 
in which the property rights of the parties were involved, de-
fendant brought an action against plaintiff to recover pos-
session of certain personal property ;8 plaintiff cross-com-
plained claiming damages for ''abuse of process'' in the use 
of the provisional remedy of claim and delivery by defendant 
in that action for possession. The trial was consolidated 
with the main action heretofore discussed. The court found 
"The parties will still be referred to as plaintiff and defendant as they 
are in the discussion of the main action. 
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involved in the main action and caused a claim and 
writ to issue and be served; that he had the sheriff come to the 
house with his writ where was was 
also and served the writ and 
the automobile and took an of the 
claimed in the all without consent. Plain-
tiff got in touch with her but the sheriff remained for 
several hours at the house and would not leave without the 
property until counsel obtained an order enjoining 
him from seizing the property. While the sheriff and de-
fendant were there defendant said he would drop his pro-
ceeding for claim and delivery if plaintiff dropped the main 
action, that the action and claim and delivery proceedings 
caused plaintiff anguish and mental suffering to the damage 
of $500, together with punitive damages of $1,000 and $1,500 
attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in stopping the further-
ance of the claim and delivery writ. Judgment accordingly 
followed from which defendant appeals. Defendant had de-
posited a cash undertaking of $16,000 in the claim and de-
livery proceeding and after entry of the judgment he moved 
to exonerate the undertaking. The court exonerated it to 
the extent of $12,000. 
'rreating the action as one for abuse of process it ap-
pears that the evidence is sufficient to support the findings 
and malice may be inferred from defendant's conduct, if it is 
required, in such an action or to make a case for punitive dam-
ages. While the sheriff did not actually seize the property 
except the automobile, he served the writ and in effect seized 
it, and it may be inferred that he was interfering with plain-
tiff's property right. The automobile was seized. Plainly it 
was done for the ulterior purpose of making things difficult 
for plaintiff so she would her main action. It was like a 
threat, not really to obtain possession of the property which 
he claimed as his own, but to coerce her with regard to the 
main action. 
[13] The rule with reference to the tort involved is stated 
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" 'One who uses whether criminal or civil, 
against another to a purpose for which it is not 
designed is liable to the other for the loss caused 
'Comment: 
[14] " 'a. The gravamen of the misconduct for which the 
liability stated in this Section is imposed is not the wrongfu] 
procurement of process or the initiation of 
criminal or civil proceedings ; it is the misuse of process, no 
matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that 
which it was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immate-
rial that the process was properly that it was obtained 
in the course of proceedings which were brought with prob-
able cause and for a proper purpose or even that the proceed-
ings terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating 
them. The subsequent misuse of the process, though properly 
obtained, constitutes the misconduct for which the liability 
is imposed under the rule stated in this Section.' 
''So in 1 Cooley on Torts, fourth edition, section 131, 
pages 434-435 we read: 'If process, either civil or criminal, is 
wilfully made use of for a purpose not justified by the law, 
this is abuse for which an action will lie. The action will lie 
although the process was lawfully issued upon a valid judg-
ment for a just cause and is valid in form. The grievance 
for which redress is sought arises in consequence of subse-
quent acts-the illegal and malicious abuse of the power con-
ferred by the judgment and writ.' 
"The rule is similarly stated in Dean v. Kochendorfer, 237 
N.Y. 384 [143 N.E. 229, 231) by Mr. Justice Pound of the 
Court of Appeals: 
" 'The gist of the action for abuse of process lies in the 
improper use of process after it is issued. To show that regu-
larly issued process was perverted to the accomplishment of 
an improper purpose is enough.' 
"To the same effect are 50 C .• T. 612; 1 Am .• Jur. 176; Prosser 
on Torts, § 98, p. 892 et seq.; Ooplea v. Bybee, 290 IH.App. 
117 [8 N.E.2d 55); Ash v. Oohn, 119 N.J.L. 54 [194 A. 174]; 
8aliem v. Glovsky, 132 Me. 402 [172 A. ; Defnall v. Schoen, 
73 Ga.App. 25 [35 S.E.2d ; Ellis v. Wellons, 224 N.C. 
269 [29 S.E.2d 884]; Nix v. Goodhill, 95 Iowa 282 [63 N.W. 
701, 58 .Am.St.Rep. 434] : Kool v. 43 Utah 394 P. 
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906] ; and cases collected in the notes in 80 A.L.R. 580 and 86 
Am.St.Rep. 397; and cf. the dictum in Crews v. Mayo, 165 
Cal. 493 at p. 495 [13 P. 1032] .... Whether malice is a 
necessary element of this tort has been questioned (50 C. J. 
616-617; 1 Am.Jur. 179-180) but if malice is a necessary ele-
ment it is settled that it may be inferred from the wilful abuse 
of the process (50 C.J. 616; 1 Am.Jur. 192 Prosser on Torts, 
893-894; Oople.a v. supra, 290 117 [8 N.E.2d 
55, 59) ; and cases collected in 80 A.L.R. 582)." (Emphasis 
added.) Dean Prosser, University of California School of 
Law, has the following to say with the citation of many author-
ities: ''The action for malicious prosecution, whether it be 
permitted for criminal or civil proceedings, has failed to pro-
vide a remedy for a group of cases in which legal procedure 
has been set in motion in proper form, with probable cause, 
and even with ultimate success. but nevertheless has been per-
verted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not 
designed. In such cases a tort action has been developed for 
what is called abuse of process .... 
"Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution 
in that the gist of the tort is not commencing an action 
or causing process to issue without justification, but mismdng 
or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other 
than that which it was designed to accomplish. The purpose 
for which the process is used, once it is issued, is the only thing 
of importance. Consequently in an action for abuse of process 
it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove that the proceed-
ing has terminated in his favor, or that it was obtained without 
probable cause or in the course of a proceeding begun without 
probable cause .... 
[15] "The essential elements of abuse of process, as the 
tort has developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior 
purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not 
proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Some defi-
nite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at 
an objective not legitimate in the use of the process, is 
required; and there is no liability where the defendant has 
done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized 
~onclusion, even though with bad intentions. The improper 
purpose 1tsu.ally takes the form of coercion to obtain a col-
lateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding 
itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of 
money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club. There 
is, in other words, a form of extortion, and it is what is done 
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issuance or 
constitutes the tort. 
p. 667. This 
.,...,."""'""'-" under the claim 
recent discussion this to the recovery 
of fees under various circumstances states the gen-
eral rules: " fees to are not recov-
erable from the or otherwise, 
in the absence of express contractual authority. 
Section 512 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which 
sets forth the of the to be furnished 
in claim and to the defend-
ant 'of such sum as may from any cause be recovered against 
the ' Section 667 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
permits either the defendant in a replevin 
action to recover of the property 
or its value for its taking and 
detention. 
[18] "It is clear that there is no express authority for the 
allowance of fees in claim and delivery, and the 
cases have refused to award such fees as damages in 
actions for the recovery of property." (Le JJ'ave v. 
Dimond, 46 Cal.2d 870 P.2d .) What is there 
said is we are dealing with the tort of 
abuse of process rather than where an ultimately unsuccessful 
plaintiff uses claim and We find no statute or 
contract allowing fees such torts and thus the 
judgment in that action must be reversed to that extent. 
The orders support and attorney's fees 
pendente lite trial and on appeal except insofar as they 
allow attorney's fees to on appeal are reversed; the 
in the main action is reversed in the respects hereto-
fore indicated; the order relief under section 473 of 
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the Code of Civil Procedure from the order 
versed ; the of the 
in the action for claim and 
of and abuse of process, is reversed. In all other 
respects it is affirmed. 'l'he appeal from the order denying 
defendant's motion to vacate the order costs and 
's fees on is dismissed. Plaintiff shall recover 
her costs on all 
and concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-Estoppel to 
Deny tke Validity the i1l exican I agree that the 
extension of the doctrine of estoppel to the facts of this case 
is appropriate, but I would make it unmistakably clear that 
here the marriage in respect to which the doctrine is being 
applied is absolutely void ab initio. 
The conclusion in this respect is reached through reasoning 
as follows: Where the parties go through a marriage ceremony 
in reliance upon a void decree of divoree their marriage is no 
more ''valid'' than the marriage of the parties here where 
there was no judgment of divorce. 1 Therefore, as the opinion 
of Justice Carter indicates, public policy against bigamous 
marriage is no more disserved by a holding that defendant is 
estopped to deny the "validity" of the marriage here than it 
is by the more familiar holding that ''The validity of a divorce 
decree cannot be contested by a party who has procured the 
decree or a party who has remarried in reliance thereon, or 
by one who has aided another to procure the decree so that 
the latter will be free to remarry." (Rediker v. Rediker 
(1950), 35 Cal.2d 796, 808 [7] [221 P.2d 1].) Note, however, 
that in the Rediker case, at page 808, we stated, "Since the 
application of the doctrine of estoppel presupposes the entry 
of a final decree, cases involving remarriage after the entry 
of only an interlocutory decree (SuUiva.n v. Sullivan, 219 
Cal. 734, 736 [28 P.2d 914] ; Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal. 339 
[ 132 P. 439] ) , or with the first marriage unaffected by any 
1 Here there was an interlocutory decree but it is indisputable that, 
in this state, the interlocutory decree entered in a divorce action is in 
no sense a judgment of divorce. It neither purports to nor can affect 
the legal status of the parties as husband and wife. It is merely a de-
termination, in so far as status is concerned, that a divorce ''ought to be 
granted" and that one party or the otl1er or both, after the expiration 
of a year from enh·y of the interlocutory decree, shall he ''entitled to a 
divorce." (Civ. Code. ~§ 131, 132; De Burgh v. De Burgh (1952), 39 
Cal.2d 858 [250 P.2d 598].) 
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7 Cal.2d 265 [60 P.2d 290] ; 
99 [89 P.2d ) , are not 
In " 
Broad statements to the effect that favors the 
of a eveu at the suit 
Anderson ) , 
; Sullivan Sullivan (1934), 
) , made without reference to the 
should here yield to the apposite policy, 
stated as a conclusive in the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure ( § 1962, snbd. that "Whenever a party has, by his 
own or omission, int<:>ntiona11y and deliber-
led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act 
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of 
such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it." 
Defendant with full knowledge of the faets led plaintiff to 
believe that going through a bigamous marriage ceremony 
she was acquiring the status and incident rights of a lawful 
wife. He should not now be permitted to rely, to her injury, 
upon her innocent bigamy. 
It appears pertinent to observe that caution should be 
exercised in applying the doctrine of estoppel in favor of one 
spouse who goes through a bigamous marriage ceremony dur-
the interlocutory period, i.e. after entry of the inter-
decree determining riohts but before granting or 
entry of the judgment of divorce, which alone affects the 
marital status. Plaintiff's ignorance of the invalidity in 
California of th,, Mexican marriage is conceivable in the cir-
cumstances of her lack of experience, defendant's representa-
tions as to his wide experience, and the facts that she relied 
upon defendant to and defendant did arrange for her procm·-
ing the interlocutory decree establishing her right to obtain 
a judgment of divorce after the one year waiting period 
and the advice of the Mexican attorney as to the validity of a 
Mexican marrhcge. Although it is obvious that a court should 
scrutinize with caution a claimed belief that an interlocutory 
decree which is incompetent to affect status permitted a re-
in another jurisdiction before expiration of the wait-
ing period, until which time neither party was even entitled 
to for the of divorce in Califomia, a plaintiff's 
of the facts the invalidity of the void2 
•As already mentioned, it must be recognized that here the mar:riage 
is void, as distinguished from merely voidable, (See Civ. Code, §§ 61, 
80; eoo also §§ 63, 82, 86, 
Motion to 
Costs on A.ppeal. 
from the order his motion to 
foes and costs on appeal 
dismissed since the motion called upon the 
facts. 
on the same 
Cal.2d 38, 44 
[162 P.2d 8].) 
328-229) an 
out (ante, p. 
from au order a motion to vacate 
an order does not lie where the grounds on which 
to have the order vacated existed be-
and were available on therefrom. (Colbert 
, 28 Cal.2d 281 [8] [169 P.2d 633} .) 
Cause Action Based on Fraud 
that she is a Putative I further agree 
with the p that since recovery is to be 
allowed on the view that defendant is estopped to deny the 
validity of the there can be no recovery for fraud 
the or as a wife. She cannot both 
eat her cake and have it too. 
Defendant's to Divide his Property with Plain-








that if she 
her children. 
the family ..• [T]he 
of time ... and that 
asked her to tell a false reason why she 
him and a false statement of the defendant's 
as a result of these various proposals, she told 
of the defendant, the proposal that 
had been made to her in its and asked her husband whether he 
wouldn't reform so that they could continue the marriage .•• [I]nstead 
of taking the her husband admitted his incompetence, that 
he didn't feel would an economic success . • . and he frankly sug-
that she take advantage of the offer made the defendant and 
a divorce from him. 
''That she reported those facts to the defendant, who then instructed 
her with regard to the kind of settlement she should 
have, and the have with husband. 
'' 'I'hat he her she wouldn't need to retain her interest 
in her home . . . He told her she wouldn't need 
''He instructed her she wouldn't need support 
cause he would support the children .•• 
children be-
''That thereafter he instructed her what Rt1tnr'l1Av to go to and made 
prior arrangements with that to the divorce snit, 
her the money to pay for the action, that she reported 
to him on every sillgle stage divoree aetion ••• ,. 
the trial court found ''that on a number of occa-
flions prior to threatened to divorce 
Robert final decision 
that it could 
to these 
and 
that defendant made two to 
divide his and children and that 
l"'"Hn<.L~ went through the ceremony in reliance 
on the promises made after she had obtained her interlocutory 
decree of divorce and not upon the which induced 
her to obtain the interlocutory decree. In my estimation it 
cannot fairly be said, as the majority opinion says (ante, p. 
225) that "the evidence was susceptible of an interpretation 
that the divorce from Robert was merely incidental to the 
agreement"; ratber, the procuring of the interlocutory decree 
was an integral and essential part of the agreement. This 
case is not like Howard v. Adarns (1940), 16 Cal.2d 253, 256-
257 [2] [105 P.2d 971, 130 A.L.R. 1003]. There plaintiff 
had already decided on a divorce when defendant, plaintiff's 
aunt, promised to support plaintiff and her children in con-
sideration of plaintiff's obtaining the divorce in Nevada. Here 
it cannot fairly be said that there was any evidence that 
plaintiff had definitely decided to divorce Seymon before 
defendant's promises induced such decision. Nor is this case 
like Hill v. Hill (1943), 23 Cal.2d 82, 86-94 [142 P.2d 417] 
[property settlement between parties who had separated; 
before the making of the agreement the husband had sued for 
divorce and the wife had cross-complained for separate mainte-
nance], or Kreiger v. Bulpitt (1953), 40 Cal.2d 97, 100-101 
[2, 3] [251 P.2d 673] [contingent fee contract to defend in 
"At the second hearing plaintiff testified as follows: About four 
months prior to plaintiff's obtaining a divorce defendant "told me ... 
I had to divorce my husband and he would give me all security and 
everything what a woman wanted, and for the children an education ... 
[H] e would give mG everything and would make me a full fledged partner 
if I would eonsider marriage to him .... Then he called me and called 
me and repeated his offer all the time for quite a while until I finally 
told him I would talk to my husband and tell him what he had sug-
gested .... " Plaintiff disenssed the proposal with Seymon, and told 
defendant that she had given Seymon ''three months time to improve our 
condition.'' She finally decided on a divorce from her husband, informed 
defendant, and defendant made arrangement~ for the divorce. 
Oct. SPELI"ENS v. SPELLENS 
f49 C.2d 210: 317 P.2d 613] 
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which had been instituted before the mak-
I would the trial court in its 
should be nonsuited as to her cause of 
action based on defendant's oral agreement. 
As to the statement in the opinion (ante, pp. 225-
226) that ''Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to 
the that believed in faith in 
of her to defendant6 between March 
and at least after she consulted 
her attorney in this action on March 20, 1952. '' I would note 
that defendant cannot effectively assert a lack of good faith 
belief of plaintiff in the validity of her marriage before 
March 23, 1952, because defendant in his notice of appeal in 
the main action stated that "Defendant specifically does not 
appeal from that portion of the Judgment herein adjudging 
that plaintiff was the putative wife of defendant ... during 
the period March 17, 1951, to and including March 23, 1952." 
The fact that plaintiff was advised by her attorney on March 
1952, that the validity of her marriage "lay in the field 
unsettled law" does not preclude her from invoking the 
doctrine of estoppeL 
Relief under Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
the Order Taxing Cost of Transcript and Appealability 
Order Denying Relief under Section 473. I concur in the 
holding (ante, pp. 226-228) that the order taxing the cost of a 
daily reporter's transcript may be corrected under section 
473 of the Code of Civil Procedure (unless it is shown on 
reconsideration of the order taxing costs that, as defendant 
argued in the trial court and suggests on appeal, the minute 
order, "A daily transcript is ordered," did not correctly 
reflect the order of the court). Further, I agree with the 
holding (ante, pp. 228-229) that the order denying plaintiff re-
lief under section 473 is appealable. 
Maintenance of the Action for Abuse of Process. I agree in 
part with the reasons advanced in the majority opinion 
(ante, pp. 229-233) for the holding that plaintiff can recover 
in her cross-action for abuse of process. Not discussed in the 
majority opinion (or by the parties) are the questions whether 
the action for abuse of pro<cc"s is for injury to property or 
for personal injury and whether, if it is for personal injury, 
it can be maintained a wife (or one who by successfully 
4This fact could be a 
1100ght.. (See Civ. Code, § 
one, at least as to some of the :relief 
240 
person.) 
the rule of this state that one spouse can 
sue the other for to but not for injury to 
person. (Peters v. , 156 Cal. 32, 36 [103 P. 
219, 23 L.R.A.N.S. not allowed]; 
Paulus v. Bauder ), 106 591-592 [1] 
[235 P.2d 422] [action for in automobile accident sus-
tained during ; Cubbison v. 
Cubbison (1946), 73 P.2d 387] 
[action for in automobile accident not allowed].) The 
rule of for torts was recently 
applied in Watson v. Watson (1952), 39 Cal.2d 305 [246 P.2d 
19]. It is there held that was estopped to deny the 
validity of a Nevada divorce which he had and in 
reliance on which he had gone ceremony 
with defendant 307 [2, 3]). it is further held, 
plaintiff could not sue defendant prosecution 
even though the and defendant was 
bigamous and void. 
If intcrspousa1 to maintain an action for personal 
tort is to remain the rule this then that rule should 
apply here. If to invoke the doctrine of 
in order to pursue a 
is proper that that doctrine should 
maintenance action, it 
in heJ" tort action. 
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, supra, 
to reexamine the common law view of inter-
spousal immunity and it to this case, rather 
than distort to her feelings 
None of the reasons 
which have been the common law view 
apply to this action. As this demonstrates, any con-
jugal of this has long since been 
disrupted. Certainly there can be no thought of collusion 
between these The court should not decline to enter-
tain a meritorious action a spouse (or one who, like 
defendant that he is a spouse) becausf' 
of the dubious that in some future case trifling 
domestic difficulties may become the subject of litigation. 
It has been that because recovery by plaintiff 
"spouse" for injuries inflicted by defendant 
uspouse" would be property (Flores v. Brown 
(1952), 39 CaL2d 622, 630 [8} [248 P.2d 922]; Zaragosa v. 
Craven ( 1949), 33 CaL2d 315, 320 [2] [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R. 
2d 461] ) 7 "defendant spouse would then [if recovery from 
him was permitted] in effect be taking the money out of one 
• A spouse's cause of action for personal injuries, it may be noted, is 
treated differently from other in the event of the 
death of the other , 43 Cal.2d 254, 258 
[ 4] 1273 P.2d v. Washington (1956), 
47 Cal.2<l 249, 252 
By statutory 
eanses of action arising 
awarded a married 
to actions commenced and 
date of the act, all damages 
in civil action for personal injuries are the 
separate 
adding 
such married (Stats. 1957, chap. 2334, 
§ 163,5 and Civ, Code, 917le,) 
rule of the Peters 
case CaL should come from the Legisla-
ture v. (1951), supra, 106 589, 
592; Cubbison ), snpra, 73 CaLApp.2d 437, 
438) are not The rule was formulated 
by this court in reliance upon a now outmoded common law 
rule, and if this court becomes convinced that the rule is 
unwise it should fit to it. (See Brown v. Gosser 
(1953, , 262 S.W.2d 43 A.L.R.2d 626, 631.) 
incu1·red in the Claim and 
uun'"'''""' in the Cross-Action Abuse of 
Process. I agree with the refusal (ante, p. 233) 
to extend the normal rule that 's fees are not recover-
able aB or otherwise in the absence of express 
authority or statute or contract. 
In my view the should he of as follows : 
In L.A. the order fees 
and costs trial should be reversed; ~"""''""-"" appeal 
from ''All orders . . incident or to the aforesaid 
orders'' should be dismissed. 
In L.A. defendant's from the order denying 
his motion to vacate the order that he pay attorney's fees 
and costs on should be dismissed. 
In L. A. the order that defendant pay counsel fees 
and costs should be affirmed; the order denying plaintiff's 
request for support should be reversed. 
In L. A. the order motion fo.r re-
lief (under Code Civ. the order taxing 
costs should be reversed; from ''All orders 
... incident or to aforesaid order" should be dis-
missed. 
In L.A. the main I would reverse the judg-
the order as denies ali-
should be reversed. 
~A~+;;A~ of the order which denies 
but sinee has not this 
in her briefs this portion of the order should be affirmed. 
concurred. 
The of Sol Carl 
was denied Novemb(or 1957. 
were of the that the 
A. No. 24421. In Bank. Oct. 
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[1] Pleading-Supplemental Pleadings.--So-called "amended" com-
plaints are where they allege facts 
material to the case after the former complaint. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 464.) 
[2] 
[1] See Cal.Jur., 
McK. Dig. References: 
[3] Decedents' Estates, § 449; 
Estates, § 551; [6] Decedents' 
